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DELIMITATION QUESTIONS IN
UNITED STATES v. CALIFORNIA (1980)
JOHN BRISCOE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether the federal government or the coastal states have jurisdic-
tion over coastal submerged lands has been litigated since 1945 in
successively more refined forms. In 1947, The Supreme Court held in
United States v. California' that the federal government has jurisdic-
tion seaward of the ordinary low water mark over all territorial sea
lands. Congress, however, in the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,2
quitclaimed to the coastal states all federal interest in all lands and
natural resources three geographical miles seaward of a state's "coast
line." For certain Gulf Coast states, the grant extended to nine geo-
graphic miles. In 1953 Congress also enacted the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act.3 It declared that the United States owned all sub-
merged lands seaward of lands the Submerged Lands Act granted to
the states. The Submerged Lands Act temporarily quelled the acri-
monious dispute, because there was technology to exploit the natural
resources, petroleum in particular, of submerged land in only the
shallowest water.
By 1963, disputes between the federal government and the states
* Member, Washburn & Kemp, San Francisco, California; J.D., University of
San Francisco, 1972. Mr. Briscoe was counsel for the State of California in the
proceedings before the Special Master and the Supreme Court, and serves as special
counsel for the State of Alaska in the dispute concerning the submerged lands of the
Beaufort Sea, United States v. Alaska, United States Supreme Court No. 84, Original.
1. 332 U.S. 804 (1947).
2. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311-1315 (1976).
3. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976).
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intensified, as the scarcity of land-based natural resources increased
and the technology for recovering off-shore natural resources ad-
vanced.4 Thus, it became necessary to refine and to delineate the
boundary between federal and state submerged lands.5 The federal
government asked the Supreme Court in United States v. California6
to define the term "coast line" as used in the Submerged Lands Act.
In 1965 the Supreme Court provided the definition, utilizing provi-
sions of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone (Geneva Convention),7 which had codified meth-
ods of delimiting the boundaries of the two maritime zones. In the
1980 decision in United States v. California,8 the parties again asked
the Court to construe the term "coast line." At issue was whether the
California coast line at certain points followed the mean lower low-
water line along the natural shore at certain points, or whether it fol-
lowed the seaward edge of a number of piers and an artificial island
complex projecting into the sea.
There are several reasons to consider the Supreme Court's 1980
decision in United States v. Calfornia which held that pile-supported
piers and a shore-connected artificial island erected on the California
coast were not to be treated as part of the baseline.9 First, the deci-
sion ignored a wealth of scholarship which the parties provided.
That scholarship contained the views of Philip C. Jessup for Califor-
nia and Elihu Lauterpacht, Q.B., for the United States.' 0 The schol-
arship may prove useful in the near future because domestic
litigation between the coastal states and the federal government
shows no sign of abating. For example, Alaska's boundary in the
Beaufort Sea is before a Special Master in United States v. Alaska,
No. 84, Original; the status of the Mississippi Sound as inland waters,
and the seaward boundaries of Mississippi and Alabama are before
the Special Master in United States v. Louisiana, No. 9, Original; and
4. Report of Alfred A. Arraj, Special Master, United States v. California, 447 U.S.
1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Report].
5. Id
6. 381 U.S. 139 (1965) (the Court had retained jurisdiction over the case since its
1947 decision).
7. April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639.
8. 447 U.S. 1 (1980).
9. Id at3.
10. Compare United States v. California, 447 U.S. 1 (1980) with United States v.
Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969) (the depth of the Court's analysis in Caliornia far sur-
passes that in the Louisiana decision).
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the question of the limits of the inland waters of Block Island Sound,
Vineyard Sound and Nantucket Sound is before the Special Master
in United States v. Maine, No. 35, Original.
Second, international questions of baseline determination, and
thus of the delimitation of the seaward boundaries of offshore zones
such as the territorial sea, touch current interests. The United Na-
tions Law of the Sea Conference (United Nations Conference) ap-
proved the Convention on the Law of the Sea (Convention) l' on
December 10, 1982. It contains several provisions, absent from the
1958 Geneva Convention, relating to the determination of baselines
and to the breadth and delimitation of offshore zones. Article 3 of
the Convention, for example, provides that the breadth of the territo-
rial sea may be as much as twelve miles. The 1958 Geneva Conven-
tion was silent on the point, but permitted the inference that the
breadth could be no more than twelve miles. Moreover, Article 33 of
the Convention doubles the permissible breadth of the contiguous
zone to 24 miles. A new regime of archipelagic waters is in Part IV,
and Article 47 describes the method of drawing baselines to enclose
such waters. Part V of the Convention provides for the first interna-
tional recognition of an Exclusive Economic Zone, the maximum
breadth of which must not exceed two hundred miles. Also notewor-
thy are Article 16 provisions requiring the publishing of charts or lists
of coordinates describing a coastal state's claimed baselines and off-
shore-zone limits. While there are no comparable provisions for de-
picting or describing the outer limits of the contiguous zone, Articles
47 and 75 contain parallel provisions with respect to archipelagic
baselines and the outer limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone.
Finally, the Court did not address two questions in the California
case concerning the status of ports and bays, which the Court had
referred to its Special Master (Master). A brief recounting of the par-
ties' arguments and of the Master's views on these questions may be
useful because the Master's report was not published.
This article presents a brief history of the submerged-lands cases,
emphasizing the California case. The article also describes the issues
raised on the parties' motions which led to the 1980 decision and de-
cree, the report to the Special Master, the decision of the Court, and
the parties' substantial points which the Court did not treat. In addi-
11. Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc.A/CONF.62/122 (1982).
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tion, it considers the two questions the Special Master resolved ad-
versely to the United States.
II. HISTORICAL DISCUSSION OF THE SUBMERGED LAND CASES
In 1945, the United States commenced an action against the State
of California in the United States Supreme Court to determine own-
ership of the lands underlying the "three-mile belt" seaward of the
low-water mark off California's coast. 2 Two years later, the first de-
cision in the case held that the United States had not established its
title to the Submerged lands, but possessed "paramount rights" in
them.'3 An incident of these "paramount rights," wrote Justice Black
for the majority, is "full dominion over the resources of the soil under
that water area, including oil." 4 Foreshadowing its decision nearly
thirty years later in United States v. Maine, 5 the Court found there
was little historical support for the proposition that the thirteen origi-
nal colonies acquired separate ownership of the three-mile belt or the
soil under it. That is so even though the colonies' revolution gave
them elements of the sovereignty of the English crown. 6
The Court followed the 1947 Caifornia decision in two 1950 cases.
The Court found that Louisiana's claim to the lands underlying the
marginal sea and beyond were no more compelling than California's
claims.' 7 The Court also rejected Texas' claim, notwithstanding
Texas' existence as an independent republic prior to admission to
statehood.'8 Ironically, the same principle upon which California
and Louisiana had grounded their arguments, the equal-footing doc-
trine,'9 defeated Texas' argument. Texas posited that as a republic, it
possessed full sovereignty over the territorial sea as well as ownership
12. The United States invoked the original jurisdiction of the court conferred by
Article III, Section Two, Clause Two of the United States Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
13. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 39 (1947).
14. Id
15. 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
16. 332 U.S. at 31-33.
17. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 704-705 (1950).
18. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 718-720 (1950).
19. The equal-footing doctrine holds that subsequently admitted states attain to
all the incidents of sovereignty enjoyed by the original thirteen states, one of which
was ownership and dominion over the tidelands within their state borders. See
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894); Knight v. U.S. Land Ass'n., 142 U.S. 161,
183 (1891); Pollards Lessee v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228-229 (1845).
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of it. The Court held, however, that Texas relinquished sovereignty
and ownership to the national government upon admission to the
union. That placed Texas on an equal footing with the other states.2 °
After the 1947 Caifornia decision, the Court appointed William H.
Davis of New York as Special Master to delineate the "ordinary low
water mark" along certain disputed segments of the California coast.
The Special Master's report was filed with the Court in 1952,21 but
before the Court took it up, Congress passed the Submerged Lands
Act (Act).22 The Act "restored" to the seaboard states the rights to
their offshore submerged lands, rights Congress evidently thought the
California decision of 1947 had divested.23 The Submerged Lands
Act quitclaimed to California and the other coastal states whatever
interest the federal government may have had in the lands and natu-
ral resources therein lying within three geographic miles seaward of
the "coast line.",24
Virtually at the same time, Congress enacted the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf Lands Act, which declared that the subsoil and seabed of the
outer continental shelf appertain to the United States and are subject
to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition. 25 The Act de-
fined "coast line," as "the line of ordinary low-water along that por-
tion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the
line marking the seaward limit of inland waters.",26 That term was
the principal point of contention in the thirty years of litigation2 7 fol-
lowing passage of the Act.
The first decision came promptly. InAlabama v. Texas 28 the Court
upheld the Act as a valid exercise of Congress' power under the prop-
erty clause of the Constitution.29 The power of Congress to dispose
of federal property, the Court held, has no limitation.30
The Court next decided Submerged Lands cases in 1960. The Act
20. 339 U.S. at 718.
21. United States v. California, 344 U.S. 872 (1952).
22. 43 U.S.C. 1301-43 (1976).
23. See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 28 (1960).
24. 43 U.S.C. at § 1311(b)(1) (1976).
25. Id at § 1332(a).
26. Id at § 1301(c).
27. The single exception is United States v. Alaska, 442 U.S. 184, 186 n.2 (1975).
28. 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
29. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
30. 347 U.S. at 275.
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had relinquished to the coastal states the United States' interest in all
lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the states.31
The "boundaries" of the states were defined as they existed at the
time a state became a member of the Union, or thereafter approved
by the Congress, not extending, however, seaward from the coast of
any state more than three marine leagues (nine nautical miles) in the
Gulf of Mexico or more than three nautical miles in the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans.32 Thus, the Gulf coast states received an opportunity
to prove that their boundaries extended seaward of three nautical or
geographic miles. In United States v. Louisiana,33 the Court held that
the Submerged Lands Act gave Texas a belt of three marine leagues'
width, but Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama had not proven their
cases, and, therefore, received only the lands within three nautical
miles from their coasts. In United States v. Florida,34 the Court held
that the Submerged Lands Act granted to Florida, on its Gulf coast, a
three-marine league belt of land. The Constitution of Florida that
Congress approved when it readmitted Florida to representation in
Congress following the Civil War plainly describes this three-league
boundary. 5
The most significant decision in the submerged lands cases follow-
ing passage of the Act was the 1965 United States v. Caifornia deci-
sion.36 After its 1947 decision and its receipt in 1952 of the Special
Master's report, the Court retained jurisdiction to resolve ensuing dis-
putes between the parties, particularly those pertaining to the sea-
ward boundary of the grant. 7 No action was taken on the Special
Master's report following passage of the Act in 1953 because the Act's
grant to California of the mineral rights in the three-mile belt vested
in California all of the interests that were then thought to be impor-
tant. By 1963, however, drilling techniques had improved so as to
revitalize the importance of the line between state and federal sub-
merged lands. The United States filed an amended complaint reviv-
31. 43 U.S.C. at § 1311.
32. Id. at § 1301.
33. 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
34. 363 U.S. 121 (1960).
35. Id at 122-129.
36. 381 U.S. 139 (1965). A thorough treatment of this decision is beyond the
scope of this article, and has in any event been given elsewhere.
37. See, e.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 804, 805 (1947) (order and de-
cree) and 382 U.S. 448, 453 (1966) (supplemental decree).
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ing the Special Master's Report and redescribing the issues as
modified by the Submerged Lands Act. Both the United States and
California filed new exceptions to the Report and the case was ready
for decision.38
The principal issue was the interpretation of "coast line" and "in-
land waters" in the Submerged Lands Act.39 The Court reviewed the
legislative history of the Act and developments in the international
law of maritime boundaries since enactment of the Submerged Lands
on May 22, 1953. The Court rejected the United States' contention
that the Government's positions in international affairs as of that date
should control the Act's construction. The Court held that Congress
left the responsibility of defining "coast line" and "inland waters" to
the Court.' The Court gave content to the Act's terms "coast line"
and "inland waters," by adopting the definitions in the 1958 Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.41
In a point of considerable domestic significance today, the Court
concluded that future changes in international law will not cause the
boundary between state and federal lands to stray from its position
under the terms of the 1958 Geneva Convention. The new Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, containing boundary provisions that dif-
fer in many respects from those of the 1958 Geneva Convention, if it
is ratified by the United States may create one set of boundaries for
purposes of the Submerged Lands Act and another for delimiting the
extent of American territorial waters.42 Ironically, it was precisely to
avoid this circumstance that the Court adopted the provisions of the
38. 381 U.S. at 148-149.
39. Among the subsidiary issues addressed in the decision, the Court held that, in
general, a state could not avail itself of the straight-baselines provision of the 1958
Geneva Convention if the United States had not chosen to employ such baselines for
international purposes. Id at 167-169. The Court also considered whether several
indentations of the California coast constituted bays under the 1958 Geneva Conven-
tion, such that "closing lines" should be drawn across their entrance points, from
which the three-mile belt would be measured, rather than from the shore line within
the bay. It also treated the requirements for making out a claim of a historic bay, an
exception to the strict geographic requirements of Article Seven of the 1958 Geneva
Convention respecting "juridical" bays; the meaning of "ordinary low-water" as used
in Article Three; and the status of roadsteads and new coast lands formed by "artifi-
cial" accretion. Id at 170-177.
40. Id at 164-165.
41. See 15 U.S.T. (Pt. 2) 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639.
42. There are some deviations at present; the nine-mile grants under the Sub-
merged Lands Act to Texas and Florida in the Gulf of Mexico are the most salient
examples. The new Convention must be ratified by sixty countries before it has more
1983]
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Geneva Convention.43
Many decisions have followed the 1965 California case. The 1967
decision in United States v. Louisiana,' held that Texas' claim under
the three-league grant of the Act would be measured by the boundary
which existed in 1845 when Texas entered the Union, and not from
artificial jetties built thereafter. Two years later, in what Justice
Black's dissent termed a "heads I win, tails you lose" decision, the
Court held, notwithstanding its 1967 decision, that where erosion had
caused the Texas shoreline to recede from its 1845 location, Texas'
three-league grant must be measured from its coastline as it exists at
present.45
The 1969 Louisiana Boundary Case46 is significant for its applica-
tion of the principles of the 1958 Geneva Convention to numerous
geographic features of the Louisiana coastline. As an example, the
Court held that dredged channels do not constitute "outermost per-
manent harbour works" within the meaning of Article 8 of the 1958
Geneva Convention because they are not "raised structures. ' 47 The
Court referred to a special master a number of questions respecting
the location of Louisiana's coastline that the Court did not decide. 8
Special Master Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., took testimony and received
evidence on these issues and filed his report, dated July 31, 1974, with
the Court. Both the United States and Louisiana took exception to
portions of the report. In its decree of March 7, 1975, the Court over-
ruled the exceptions of each and adopted the Special Master's
recommendations.49
In United States . Maine,5o the United States had fied suit against
the thirteen Atlantic seaboard states, challenging those states' claims
that their respective colonial charters had given them rights in the
seabed and subsoil beyond three nautical miles into the Atlantic
Ocean. The Court severed the action against Florida and referred
than minimal international impact. The Convention will not bind the United States
until the United States signs it.
43. United States v. Louisiana, 389 U.S. 155, 165 (1967).
44. 389 U.S. 155 (1967).
45. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 1 (1969).
46. 394 U.S. 11 (1969).
47. Id at 36-40.
48. Id at 74-78.
49. United States v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 529 (1975).
50. 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
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the remaining case to Special Master Albert B. Maris to conduct
hearings on the contentions of the parties. The Special Master's Re-
port, dated August 27, 1974, agreed with the United States that these
states had relinquished, upon forming the Union, whatever rights
they once enjoyed in lands beyond the three-mile belt. The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice White, adopted the recommendations
of the Special Master.5 '
In another 1975 decision, the Court again addressed questions con-
cerning the coastline of Florida.5 2 This decision was similarly made
upon exceptions of the United States and Florida to the Report of the
Special Master, and it concerned both the seaward boundary of Flor-
ida's rights in the continental shelf of the Atlantic Ocean as well as
Florida's boundary on the Gulf coast. The Court referred the status
of Florida Bay back to the Special Master, and subsequently, the par-
ties entered a stipulated decree. 3
The Supreme Court decided United States v. Alaska54 in 1975. It
was the only Submerged-Lands case the Court did not hear under its
original jurisdiction. The Court held that Alaska had not met its bur-
den of proving that Cook Inlet was a "historic bay." Thus, the
boundary of Alaska's submerged-lands grant must be measured from
the low-water line of the shore of the inlet, not from a closing line
drawn across its entrance.
Other recent Submerged-Lands decisions include the second sup-
plemental decree in United States v. California,55 which established
closing lines across the entrances to several bodies of inland waters.
The opinion also found a number of structures to constitute "artificial
extensions" of the coastline. In the same case the following year, the
Court rejected the United States' claim that following the Act's pas-
sage it had retained title to the submerged lands within one nautical
mile of Santa Barbara and Anacapa Islands off California's coast as
part of the Channel Islands National Monument. The Government
based its argument on the "claim of right" exception to the grant of
the Submerged Lands Act.56 A 1980 decision in United States v. Lou-
51. Id at 522-24.
52. United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1975).
53. United States v. Florida, 425 U.S. 791 (1976).
54. 422 U.S. 184 (1975).
55. 432 U.S. 40 (1977).
56. United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32 (1978).
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isiana, 57 perhaps the final chapter in the Louisiana litigation, con-
cerned an agreement between the United States and Louisiana
providing for impounding oil royalties pending resolution of the
boundary dispute.58
III. THE 1980 UNITED STATES vJ CALIFORNIA DECISION
The parties' cross-petitions for entry of a supplemental decree
specifying the seaward limits of the inland waters of San Pedro and
San Diego Bays 9 and whether sixteen pile-supported piers on the
California coast were part of the "coastline" within the meaning of
the Act precipitated the 1980 decision in United States v. California. 60
The Court referred the matter to Special Master Alfred A. Arraj.
Judge Arraj conducted hearings in New York and Denver during
1979. He submitted his report to the Supreme Court on August 29,
1979.
a. The Closing-Line Issues
The questions of the closing lines of San Pedro and San Diego
Bays are best understood by reading the account given of them by the
Special Master and examining figures I, I-A and II accompanying his
report.6' In summary, the Special Master recommended adoption of
California's positions on both questions. At San Diego, California
argued for drawing the closing line from the seaward tip of the
Zuniga jetty to the mean lower-low water line on the seaward tip of
Point Loma. The United States argued for a line drawn from the
seaward tip of Point Loma to a point more inland on the deteriorated
jetty, where its crown dipped below the elevation of mean lower-low
water. California argued for drawing the line at San Pedro from the
east end of the Long Beach breakwater to the East Anaheim Bay
jetty. The United States argued for drawing the line from the east
57. 452 U.S. 726 (1980).
58. The agreement is mentioned in A. SHALOWITZ, I SHORE AND SEA BOUNDA-
RIES 199 n.42 (1962).
59. The two bays were concededly juridical bays; the sole questions were the loca-
tions of their "closing lines."
60. 447 U.S. 1 (1980).
61. Report, supra note 4, at 6-19. The mentioned diagrams are reproduced as an
appendix to this article.
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end of the Long Beach breakwater to the West Alamitos Bay jetty.6"
There are several ways to frame the question of the proper location
of the line enclosing the inland waters of the Port of San Pedro. In
the Act's terms, the issue may be framed as the location of "the line
marking the seaward limit of inland waters."63 In addition, because
both parties agreed that the "inland waters" of San Pedro constituted
both a port and a harbor, the issue could be framed in terms of both
Article 7 and Article 8 of the Geneva Convention. Article 7, which
deals with bays, provides in Subsection (4) that the closing line is to
be drawn between the "natural entrance points" of the bay. Article 8,
which addresses the status of ports and harbors, specifies, when read
in connection with its official commentary, that the closing line is to
be drawn between the "outermost permanent harbour works which
form an integral part of the harbour system. . . ." Thus, inasmuch
as the Supreme Court had grafted onto the Act the provisions of the
Convention, the San Pedro issue could be expressed in terms of
(a) the "natural entrance points" to the bay, or (b) the outermost har-
bor facilities which formed an integral part of the harbor system. In
addition, the issue entailed law of the case. The Supreme Court's
1966 Supplemental Decree' implementing its 1965 decision had
specified certain portions of the closing line of San Pedro Bay. It
decreed that the three segments of outer breakwaters, the San Pedro
breakwater, the Middle breakwater and the Long Beach breakwater,
together with straight lines drawn connecting the two gaps between
the breakwaters, constituted the seaward limits of the port. The 1966
Supplemental Decree, however, expressly avoided drawing a closing
line between the eastern end of the Long Beach breakwater and the
shore on the east side of the Bay.65
California stressed that the Anaheim Bay jetties were the outer-
most harbor facilities, in the language of Article 8, "which form an
integral part of the harbour system" of the San Pedro Bay area. The
Special Master found this argument persuasive: "The San Pedro Bay
is not one isolated harbor or bay which happens to contain facilities
for loading and off-loading ships."6 6 He noted that the harbor system
62. See Figures I and I-A appended to the report of the Special Master and repro-
duced as an appendix to this article.
63. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1976).
64. 382 U.S. 448 (1966).
65. Id at 451.
66. Report, supra note 4, at 8.
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comprised the facilities relating to Anaheim Bay, Alamitos Bay, Seal
Beach pier, Long Beach marina, and extensive federal facilities at
Terminal Island, as well as at Los Angeles, Wilmington, and San Pe-
dro. Moreover, the Master noted that the Navy's facilities at
Anaheim Bay and Terminal Island were integrally related because
naval vessels destined for repairs at Terminal Island off-load their
weapons and ammunition just inside the Long Beach breakwater.
The weapons and ammunition are then transported to the Seal Beach
Naval Weapons Station. The vessel then proceeds to the Terminal
Island Naval Shipyard. These facts, the Master found, aided in es-
tablishing the Anaheim Bay jetties as an integral "part of the [San
Pedro] harbor system."67
Approaching the San Pedro issue from Article 7 (bays), the Master
noted that in the 1961 Louisiana decision68 the Supreme Court ex-
pressly held that the Coast Guard's "inland water lines," were inap-
propriate to determine the seaward limits of "inland waters" for
purposes of the Act and Convention because the Coast Guard had
promulgated them simply to establish where mariners must follow
inland rules of the road. Nonetheless, because of the utility of these
lines for mariners, and the fact that the lines connect prominent
landmarks for ease of ascertainment, the Master agreed with Califor-
nia that these lines constituted relevant evidence for the limited pur-
pose of helping to determine the "natural entrance points" of a bay
within the meaning of Article 7. The Master wrote,
The inland water navigation lines simply provide one additional
source of evidence shedding light on what constitute the en-
trance and the outermost permanent harbor works as those
terms are used in the Geneva Convention.69
The lines separating, for navigation purposes, inland waters from
those waters on which the London Convention controls are known as
"COLREGS Demarcation Lines."7 These lines were first promul-
gated in 1977."' Specifically, they establish a line from the seaward
tip of the Anaheim Bay east jetty to the seaward tip of the Anaheim
Bay west jetty to the eastern tip of the Long Beach breakwater.72
67. Id at 12.
68. 394 U.S. at 17-19.
69. Report, supra note 4, at 12.
70. See 42 Fed. Reg. 35782 (1977) (now codified at 33 C.F.R. Part 80.01 (1983).
71. See 42 Fed. Reg. 35782 (1977).
72. See 33 C.F.R. § 82.1135(a) (1978).
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The parties also agreed that San Diego Bay constitutes both a ju-
ridical bay and a port. As the Special Master noted73 the question
can be phrased as what constitutes the port's "outermost permanent
harbour works," or, in Article 7 terms, what constitutes the bay's
"natural entrance points." The San Diego dispute was more narrow
than in the case of San Pedro. The principal controversy was
whether the seaward tip of the Zuniga jetty was one of the "entrance
points" (the parties agreed that Point Loma was the other) or, in
terms of Article 8, an "outermost permanent harbour work." The
United States contended that because the jetty had deteriorated such
that its southernmost segment was largely "submerged," the appro-
priate eastern terminus of the closing line should be at that point
where the crown of the jetty first dipped below the plane of mean
lower-low water. The Master rejected the United States position,
finding that the entire length of the jetty constituted a harbor work
and that the seaward tip of the jetty constituted the outermost perma-
nent harbor work within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention
and paragraph 4(b) of the 1966 Decree. 4 The Master also found that
the Government's COLREGS line supported California's position.75
The Special Master rejected the United States' positions partly be-
cause he found that earlier Supreme Court cases did not sanction the
two tests the United States urged for ascertaining the ends of the clos-
ing lines.76 (A third such criterion, not applicable to the case, is the
"bisector of the angle" test. The Supreme Court specifically ap-
proved it in the first supplemental decree in the California case.) The
two tests the Government advocated in the case were the "45-degree-
angle" test and the "shortest-distance-line" test, which the Govern-
ment claimed is an appropriate criterion to employ when the 45-de-
gree test is unworkable. 7 The Government, noting that its 45-degree
test was inapplicable in each situation, urged adoption of the short-
est-distance line test for enclosing the inland waters of San Pedro and
San Diego Bays. The Special Master specifically disapproved this
73 Report, supra note 4, at 14.
74 Id at 18; 382 U.S. at 450.
75. Report, supra note 4, at 18-19,
76 Id at 8.
77, For an explanation of these tests for determining the "natural entrance
points" of a bay, see Report, supra note 4, at 8 n.8; see also R. Hodgson and L.
Alexander, Towards an Objective Analysis of Special Circumstances, Law of the Sea
Institute Occasional Paper No. 13 at 3-22 (1972).
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test. Inasmuch as the shortest-distance test, as the government notes,
is to be employed where the 45-degree-angle test is unworkable, the
latter criterion would seem likewise impermissible in the view of the
Master. The United States did not file exceptions to the Special
Master's recommendations on the two closing lines. The United
States also acquiesced in the entry of a decree specifying the lines
California wanted.
b. The Status of the Sixteen Piers as Parts of the Baseline.
Two prominent authorities in the field testified on the status of the
sixteen pile-supported piers. Elihu Lauterpacht, Q.B., testified for
the United States, and Philip C. Jessup, formerly judge of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, testified for California. Both scholars fo-
cused on whether the structures qualified as part of the coast under
Article 8 of the 1959 Geneva Convention. The Special Master found
their views superfluous generally. The "practical approach" of com-
mentators McDougal and Burke guided the Master's recommenda-
tions. In their book The Public Order of the Oceans, McDougal and
Burke wrote in 1962:
When the construction of an area of land served consequential
coastal purposes, it would seem to be in the common interest to
permit the object to be used for delimitation purposes . . . The
ricipal policy issue in determining whether any effect for de-ation purposes ought to be attributed to other formations
and structures is whether they create in the coastal state any par-
ticular interest in the surrounding waters that would otherwise
not exist, requiring that the total area of the territorial sea be
increased.78
Influenced by the "reasonableness" test of McDougal and Burke, the
Special Master found that neither the piers nor the Rincon Island
complex created an "interest in the surrounding waters that would
not otherwise exist." The Special Master noted that harbor works
connected with a conventional harbor create an interest in maintain-
ing the navigational integrity and safety of the surrounding waters.
Such an interest, the Master concluded, justifies treating the artificial
structures as modifications of the natural coast. Artificial structures
not connected with a harbor, but considered a part of the coast, help
maintain the natural shore line, create navigable channels for ocean-
78. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 388
(1962) [hereinafter cited as McDOUGAL & BURKE].
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going vessels, or otherwise aid coastal maintenance and improve-
ment. In that context, they too, create an interest in the surrounding
waters justifying use of the structures as base-points for measuring
the Submerged Lands Act boundaries. The piers did not help main-
tain the coast and the volume of shipping handled by the three oil
company piers did not justify assimilating those piers to harbor works
within the meaning of Article 8."9
McDougal and Burke, however, did not suggest that their criterion
was applicable to structures connected with the coast, as were the Cal-
ifornia piers. They suggested a test to determine the status of "man-
made islands, temporarily submerged areas, structures erected on the
ocean floor, and floating objects."80 Moreover, the principle McDou-
gal and Burke advocated would contravene Article 10 of the 1958
Geneva Convention, which confines the permissible claims of territo-
rial sea surrounding islands to "naturally formed" islands.
California took exception to the Special Master's recommendations
insofar as they addressed the status of the sixteen piers. After brief-
ing and argument, the Court adopted the recommendation of the
Special Master and ruled in favor of the United States. As when the
matter was before the Special Master, the parties' principal conten-
tion was whether the sixteen piers qualified as parts of the "coast
line" by virtue of Article 8 of the 1958 Geneva Convention. Article 8
provides:
For the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, the outermost
permanent harbour works which form an integral part of the
harbor system shall be regarded as forming part of the coast.
While Article 8 appears to be facially inapplicable to the piers, which
are primarily recreational facilities and not associated with the great
harbors at San Pedro, San Diego and San Francisco, the "legislative
history" of the Article raised substantial questions. The International
Law Commission, which drafted the 1958 Geneva Convention, re-
ported in its Official Commentary to the U.N. General Assembly
with respect to Article 8 that "[p]ermanent structures erected on the
coast and jutting out to sea (such as jetties and coast protective
works) are assimilated to harbour works."'" California contended
that this Commentary and the history of its formulation demon-
79. Report, supra note 4, at 28-29.
80 McDOUGAL & BURKE. supra note 78, at 388.
81. 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 16, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
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strated that the piers should be treated as part of the coast. The
Court dismissed the contention stating,
Comment number two has been held to envision erosion of jet-
ties, but we have highlighted the beach protection or harbour
protection role they fulfill as well. A construction of the Com-
ment as including these piers and the island complex which con-
cededly do not fulfill such a role would unwarrantly extend the
most generous intimation of the Comment. [Footnote omitted;
citation omitted.]82
In dispatching the matter, the Court, as had the special Master,
disregarded a wealth of scholarship on the interpretation of Article 8.
The next section of this article summarizes that scholarship.
IV. ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA
AND THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE
The International Law Commission (Commission) drafted the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. The
Commission was formed pursuant to Article 13 of the United Na-
tions Charter. Article 13 mandates the General Assembly to "initiate
studies and make recommendations for the purpose of encouraging
the progressive development of international law and its codifica-
tion.' ' 3 The General Assembly Resolution 174(1I) of November 21,
1947, created the Commission to fulfill this mandate. The Commis-
sion's purpose was to develop and codify international law.84 At its
first session in 1949, the Commission selected the regime of the terri-
torial sea as a topic for consideration. The Commission began work
on this subject in 1952 and culminated in Article 8.85
In the 1980 California case, before both the Special Master and the
Court, the parties disagreed in several respects about the applicability
of Article 8 to the piers question. A threshold point of disagreement
was whether the article represented a codification of existing interna-
tional law, or demonstrated "progressive development" of interna-
tional law. If merely a codification of existing law, the United States
would have handily won its point. The earlier writers and authorities
had rarely addressed the question of coastal structures except in the
82. 447 U.S. at 8.
83. U.N. CHARTER art. 13, para. la.
84. G.A. Res. 174(11), U.N. Doe. A/519, at 105 (1947).
85. See A. SHALOWITZ, supra note 58, at 203.
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context of ports,86 and California's argument that several of the piers
constituted ports had not been well received. 87 If Article 8 repre-
sented a "progressive development" of international law, California
would benefit from a number of passages in the legislative history of
the Convention. The United States, noting the similarity between the
Commission's draft of Article 8 and the earlier League of Nations'
draft of a similar article, contended that Article 8 merely represented
a codification of existing international law. 8 California argued that
Article 8, particularly in light of its legislative history, should be
placed in the category of "progressive development" of international
law, at least regarding structures not strictly associated with ports.
California cited the statute of the Commission referred to above and
the Commission's Report to the General Assembly respecting the
final draft of the Convention.89
86 The work of the prestigious Institut de Droit International, for one, has car-
ied considerable influence. The 1927 draft of the Institut's rules, first adopted in
1894, provided that the baseline of the territorial sea for ports should be measured
from their extremity. Professor Gidel asked during the 1928 session that this provi-
sion be made more precise, and the Institut adopted his suggestion that the formula
speak of the "outermost fixed works" (ou'rage fixe le plus avance). 4nnuaire de
L 'nstrtut de Drolt International 642-45, 755-56 (Session de Stockholm, 1928).
The League of Nations dunng its 1930 Conference for the Codification of Interna-
tional Law adopted the Institut's formulation. See League of Nations Doc. C. 230, M.
117 1930 V.S. at 12 (1930). See also No. 3 Gidel, L. Droit International Public de la
Mer. 524-525 (1934); L. OPPENHEIM, I INTERNATIONAL LAW § 231 (1905); P. JESSUP,
THF LAw OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 69-70 (1927);
HARVARD LAw SCHOOL, RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-NATIONALITY, RE-
SPONSIBILITY OF STATES, TERRITORIAL WATERS 252 (1929); A.S. BUSTAMANTE, THE
TERRITORIAL SEA 93, 98 (1930); HIGGINS AND COLOMBOS, THE LAW OF THE SEA 126
(6th ed. 1967 [first published in 1943]); C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 454 (1945).
87 Notwithstanding that the text of Article 8 speaks of a "harbour," which is a
haven or protected area for vessels, the Commission titled Article 8 in both the
French and English texts, "'Ports." A port, as the Special Master found, is any place
where passengers or cargo may be transferred between ship and shore. A port may or
may not be a part of a harbour, which is a haven providing safe anchorage and shel-
tenng for boats from weather conditions prevailing on the open sea. Report, supra
note 4. at 7 n.7. While at least five of the California piers would qualify as "ports,"
see id at 20-21, the Special Master did not address the question of whether this fact
qualified them as part of the coastline under Article 8.
88 Brief for the United States in Opposition to California's Exception at 21-22,
United States v. California, 447 U.S. 1 (1980).
89 The Commission's Report in pertinent part states:
The distinction established in the statute between these two activities can hardly be
maintained. Not only may there be wide differences of opinion as to whether a
subject is already sufficiently developed in practice, but also several of the provi-
sions adopted by the Commission, based on a "recognized principle of interna-
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The parties also disagreed about the degree of deference to accord
the Convention's preparatory work. California noted that Justice
Brandeis had written in an earlier sea-law case, "in construing [a]
treaty its history should be consulted."9 California also noted that
the Supreme Court has frequently used the preparatory work of trea-
ties including that of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Con-
tiguous Zone.9 ' California also cited Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention on Treaties, which provides, "recourse may be had [in
interpreting treaties] to supplementary means of interpretation in-
cluding the preparatory work of the treaty. . . in order to confirm
the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31. ' '92 Signifi-
cantly, in the negotiations on the Vienna Convention on Treaties, the
United States objected to the "plain meaning" and "supplementary
means" separating tests in two Articles, making a vigorous argument
in favor of the use of preparatory work in the interpretation of trea-
ties.9 3 Mr. Lauterpacht testified for the Government that the discus-
sions of the Commission, recorded in its yearbooks, are "summary
records and their completeness and accuracy should, therefore, be
treated with some reserve. '
94
The parties did not agree on the weight accorded the Commission's
Commentaries to the text of the Convention. As noted by Professor
Briggs, the statute creating the International Law Commission re-
quires the Commission to prepare and submit commentaries together
with the text of Articles. The Commission's views are set forth in the
tional law," have been framed in such a way as to place them in the "progressive
development" category. Although it tried at first to specify which articles fell
into one and which into the other category, the Commission has had to abandon
the attempt, as several do not wholly belong to either.
Report of the International Law Commission to General Assembly, I 1 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956) reprinted in 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 255-256,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.l. (Emphasis added.)
90. Cooke v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 112 (1933).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. at 43 n.53, 45 n.58, 55, 56;
Oklahoma v. Texas, 260 U.S. 606, 632 (1923); United States v. Texas, 162 U.S. 1, 23-
38 (1896); Kinkhead v. United States, 150 U.S. 483, 486 (1893). See also 2 C. HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 533 D. (2d rev. ed. 1945) (collection of cases chiefly as inter-
preted and applied by the United States).
92. Article 31 adopts the literal textual test. See Kearney and Dalton, The Treaty
on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Kearney and Dalton].
93. Id at 519-20.
94. Brief for the United States at 22, United States v. California, 447 U.S. 1
(1980).
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Commentaries, as well as in the texts of articles. The Commentaries
interpret and qualify the text of articles. The Commission adopts
both text and Commentary before referring them to the General As-
sembly.95 On the other hand, Briggs acknowledges that other mem-
bers of the Commission have held different views on the subject.96
The parties also differed in their reading of the travaux-the dis-
cussions among the members of the Commission concerning what be-
came Article 8. They particularly disagreed about the meaning of the
Commission's second Commentary to the Article. Assuming that
California could not establish that any of the piers was part of a port
or harbor,97 the United States contended that "[N]either in 1930 [the
League of Nations Conference] nor in the preliminary proceedings
[of the drafting of the Convention] did anyone suggest that artificial
structures jutting out to sea, whatever their construction, should be
regarded as extensions of the mainland when not associated with a
port or harbor."9
Early efforts at codification, such as the League of Nations Codifi-
cation Conference, addressed the question of coastal structures, in the
context of ports.99 Coastal structures not strictly associated with
ports appear not to have been given extensive consideration before
the Commission began its work on the territorial sea. The Commis-
sion took up the subject of ports in 1952, leading to what ultimately
became Article 8. One may read the Commission's discussions and
Commentary as having sanctioned the use of fixed coastal structures
connected with the coast and not associated with a port or harbor as
base points for deliminting the territorial sea.
The Commission took the League of Nations ports proposal as its
starting point. The Commission largely confined its first two years of
95. H. BRIGGS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 189 (1965).
96. Id at 188-189.
97. Five piers were used to load and unload passengers and cargo, thus qualifying
as "ports" according to the definition the Special Master accepted. Report, supra note
4, at 7 n.7. They are the Carpinteria, Ellwood, Morro Strand, Rincon, and Port
Orford piers. The "port" at Port Orford is the pier itself; there have never been other
port facilities at Port Orford.
98. Brief for the United States at 22, United States v. California, 447 U.S. 1
(1980).
99. See. e.g., Report of the Second Committee, Conference for the Codification of
International Law, The Hague, League of Nations Doc. C.230 M. 117.1930.V. at 12
(1930) ("In determining the breadth of the territorial sea, in front of ports the outer-
most permanent harbour works shall be regarded as forming part of the coast").
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discussions to port facilities as such. On July 1, 1954, however, the
Commission discussed the status of jetties,"° dikes used to harness
tidal energy, the dikes which form the Dutch polders and other
coastal structures not related to ports or harbors.''
While several members of the Commission evidently favored treat-
ing such coastal installations separately from ports, at the end of the
1954 session the Commission treated the installations in a "com-
ment" to Article 8 in the report of the Commission's Sixth Session,
June 3-July 29, 1954. The comment indicated that "permanent struc-
tures erected on the coast and jutting out to sea such as jetties and
protecting wall or dykes" should be assimilated to "harbour
works." '0 2 The comment underwent little change in wording during
the next two sessions. It took the form of the second "Commentary"
to Article 8 when the Commission reported its work to the General
Assembly in 1956. The use of "assimilated," and the fact that most of
the structures addressed in this comment were unrelated to any port,
permit the inference that the comment addressed structures uncon-
nected with a port or harbor. On the other hand, Mr. Lauterpacht,
testifying for the United States, pointed out that the subject of the
discussion was ports. He also noted that the comment was preceded
by the remark, "this Article [then Article 9; subsequently Article 8] is
consistent with the positive law now in force."' 3  And as noted
above, one finds but passing notice to coastal installations uncon-
nected with a port or harbor.
As the work of the Commission continued over the next two years,
discussions of coastal structures occurred on several occasions. The
discussions often focused on concern over excessively long structures.
For example, the United Kingdom raised a question prior to the
Commission's 1955 session respecting a seven-mile long "pier" in the
Persian Gulf. It was suggested that installations of this type should
100. Jetties are frequently not connected with a port or harbor. A number of
jetties which the Supreme Court has decreed to constitute parts of California's coast-
line, for example, have no connection with a port or harbor nor are they "coast pro-
tective works." 432 U.S. at 41-42; Hearings Before Special Master Alfred,4. Arraj
Conducted at Denver, Colorado 220, 234, 292 (1979).
101. Summary Records of the 6th Session, [1954] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 88, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A./1954.
102. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 9
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc.A/2693 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 2 Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 155, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.l.
103. Report, supra note 4, at 26 (Testimony of Elihu Lauterpacht).
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be treated as artificial installations of the continental shelf; i e., they
should be entitled to a relatively limited navigational zone rather
than to a belt of territorial waters.'"
The United Kingdom's comment produced discussion during the
Commission's meetings in 1955. Participants generally conceded that
very long piers were too special to warrant the Commission's amend-
ing the general principle it had adopted. The importance of the dis-
cussion, however, was in the motive behind the United Kingdom's
suggestion. The Commission stated that its rule that jetties and piers
be treated as part of the coastline was based on the assumption that
those installations would be of such a type as to constitute "a physical
part of such coastline." Huge piers, the Commission noted, more
closely resembled artificial constructions on the continental shelf than
a physical part of the coastline. Therefore the Commission found it
inadvisable to use huge piers as a ground for an extension of the ter-
ritorial sea. The Commission suggested that it should treat huge
piers as oil derricks and artificial islands erected on the continental
shelf, because it had already agreed that such artificial installations
had no territorial sea. Following this discussion, the Commission
unanimously adopted Article 8.105
The subject arose several times during the Commission's work in
1956.1° Based upon a discussion on June 12 the Commission agreed
to include a reference to the United Kingdom's comment in the re-
port. The United Kingdom's comment became the third paragraph
of the Commission's Official Commentary to Article 8 as reported to
the General Assembly. The Commentary in pertinent part states:
Permanent structures erected on the coast and jutting out to
sea (such as jetties and coast protective works) are assimilated to
harbour works.'"°
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea considered
104. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 10
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9, Annex [Item 16]), U.N. Doc. A/2934 (1955), reprinted in
[19551 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 58, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1955/Add.I.
105. Summary of the 7th Session, [1955] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 73-74, U.N.
Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1955.
106. Regime of the High Seas and Regime of the Territorial Sea, Comments by
Governments, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.N.
Doc.A/CN.4/99/Add.1 (1956), reprinted in Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1.
107. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc.A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 270, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.I.
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the Commission text at Geneva in 1958. Prior to the final vote, Mr.
Francois, the Special Rapporteur, stated that "the Commission had
deliberately drawn the provision [of Article 8] in mandatory terms in
order to eliminate every shadow of doubt."'los Article 8 as drafted by
the International Law Commission was adopted April 29, 1958, by a
vote of seventy to none, with one abstention.1 9 The Convention was
signed by the President of the United States on March 24, 1961, and
was entered into force on September 10, 1964.110
The Supreme Court has held that future changes in international
law will have no effect on the grant made by the Submerged Lands
Act. Thus the work of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, which was begun in 1974, is presumptively irrelevant
for that purpose. While Article 8 has been the subject of considerable
discussion in the work leading up to the Conference and in the ses-
sions of the Conference itself, little consideration seems to have been
given the status of coastal installations unconnected with a port or
harbor.
Article I 1 of the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (informal
text) drafted at Geneva in 1980,111 incorporates the text of Article 8
of the 1958 Geneva Convention and adds to it the following sentence:
"Off-shore installations and artificial islands shall not be considered
permanent harbour works." This provision appears to represent ex-
isting law. (Article 10 of the 1958 Convention confines islands-what
one may generally call geographic features lying off a mainland-to
naturally formed areas of land.) It first appeared as Article 10 of the
"Informal Single Negotiating Text" drafted by the Second Commit-
tee Chairman at the Third Session of the Conference in May 1975.
There is no recorded discussion of this provision because informal
groups did much of the Second Committee's work.
CONCLUSION
With the renewed significance of delimination questions that the
Convention on the Law of the Sea portends, one may expect the
question addressed by the Supreme Court to be heard in the next
108. III Official Records, U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea First Committee
(Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone), 142, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.13/39 (1958).
109. Id at 142; M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 263 (1965).
110. 15 U.S.T. (Pt. 2) 1606.
111. See supra note 11.
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decade or so by an international tribunal. The use of piers as base-
points may well generate additional areas of territorial sea or Exclu-
sive Economic Zone waters that coastal states covet. If so, the
analysis should include consideration of some of the matters
presented here.
Selecting the appropriate closing lines for bodies of inland waters
is a matter of domestic as well as international significance. At pres-
ent, special masters of the Supreme Court are considering the status
of a number of alleged bodies of inland waters and will need to ad-
dress the proper method of enclosing them. These bodies include
Long Island, Block Island, Vineyard, Nantucket, Mississippi, and
Stefansson Sounds, and Harrison Bay, Alaska. Billions of dollars of
bonus payments and royalties are the prize.
The United States, as has been its practice everywhere (except in
the cases of the two California bays), will employ its 45-degree-angle
and shortest-distance-line tests to generate the closing lines it prefers.
The states may well, as did California, argue that neither the 1958
Geneva Convention nor prior decisions of the Court sanction those
tests, and therefore, the tests are not applicable. This is the view the
Special Master adopted in the California case. Note that the tests
were adopted by the Federal Government's "Baselines Committee,"
an unofficial interdepartmental group which, since 1970, has been re-
sponsible for formulating United States foreign policy on delimita-
tion questions. Among the membership of this Committee are
representatives of the Departments of Defense, Transportation
(which includes the Coast Guard), and Commerce (whose National
Ocean Survey publishes American coastal charts). The participation
of these departments is natural. The formulation of foreign policy is
a responsibility of the State Department which is another member of
the Committee. The Department of the Interior, however, is also
represented on the Committee. A primary interest of the Interior
Department is to advocate delimitation positions that constrict the
offshore holdings of the states and enlarge the Federal Government's
Outer Continental Shelf holdings. The Interior Department adminis-
ters those holdings.
The advocacy of Interior's views in the submerged-lands litigation
is, of course, unobjectionable, if it is recognized as advocacy. The
Supreme Court, however, has accorded a remarkable deference in
these cases to the official position of the United States in the conduct
of its foreign affairs, which in delimitation matters is now largely for-
mulated by the Baselines Committee. (This deference has been
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roundly criticized by the Government's former chief trial lawyer in
the cases.' 12) Given the nature of our Government, it is too much to
suggest that Interior be denied a voice on the Baselines Committee;
however, it is not too much to ask that the Committee's views be
recognized as something less than the product of pure foreign policy
considerations.
From a historical perspective, one may view the continuing conflict
over the ownership of the off-shore submerged lands as an inevitable
consequence of our federal system of government, in which there are
constituent "sovereign" states and a national government with consti-
tutionally enumerated powers. Nevertheless, the position of the na-
tional government in the submerged-lands cases constitutes an
undesirable anomaly. The government, which concededly adheres to
the most conservative baseline positions in those cases, nevertheless,
broke new ground in international law with its unilateral and expan-
sive claim to the continental shelf resources in 1945,113 its adoption of
a 200-mile exclusive fisheries zone in 1976,1 14 and its declaration of a
200-mile exclusive economic zone in 1983." 1 The new Convention
on the Law of the Sea permits a 12-mile territorial sea.1 6 Notwith-
standing the present administration's refusal to sign the Convention,
the United States may well elect to take advantage of this provision
as it has taken advantage of the exclusive economic zone. Given
these expansive claims of national jurisdiction, the United States' ex-
ceedingly conservative positions on baseline questions-as illustrated
in the issues discussed here and by its adamant refusal formally to
112. J. Charney, Judicial Deference in the Submerged Lands Cases, 7 VAND. J.
TRANS. L. 383 (1974).
113. Executive Proclamation No. 2667, 59 Stat. 884 (1945).
114. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1801-1882
(1982). Presumptively, the maximum permissible breadth of such a fisheries zone was
twelve miles. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra
note 41, Article 24; Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and ManagementAct of 1976"
First Step Toward Improved Management ofMarine Fisheries, 52 WASH. U. L. Q. 427,
438-441, 441 n.46 (1977); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 ("the ex-
tension of that fishery zone up to a 12-mile limit . . . appears now to be generally
accepted.").
115. 48 Fed. Reg. 10605 (1983). The argument is that inasmuch as the Exclusive
Economic Zone is but a creation of the 1982 Convention and has not been recognized
in customary international law, no state which is not a party to the Convention can
claim an Exclusive Economic Zone.
116. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 11, Article 3.
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declare straight baselines where appropriate-may ring hollow when
pronounced in the name of foreign affairs.
With the recent developments in international law, the Maine, Lou-
isiana and Alaska decisions in the submerged-lands litigation will be
interesting. One wonders whether the Court will continue to adhere
to its position that changes in international law will not occasion a
shift in the boundaries of the Submerged Lands Act grant. Also,
those decisions will likely precede adjudications by international
tribunals of similar questions. One can hope the Court's decisions
will serve as models of sound reasoning.
The diagrams which follow are found in the Appendix to the Re-
port. They are examples to help illustrate this article. The Report
disclaimed their accuracy, and therefore no exact measurements or
other purpose requiring accuracy should be expected of them. For a
complete set of the diagrams, the reader should refer directly to the
Report.
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